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Poverty Alleviation and State Building in




The literature suggests that the distributive allocations of local public goods help
politicians secure support and thus contribute to political survival. We argue that
the selective assignment of state-led infrastructure projects can bolster political control
in peripheral areas by inducing the government’s investment in essential administra-
tive and security apparatus for project implementation and long-term state-building.
Drawing on a unique county-level dataset, we study the e↵ects of poverty alleviation
transfers in Xinjiang. We find that poverty alleviation was associated with significant
increases in government spending on public management and security. In contrast,
these alleviation transfers had a small and ambiguous e↵ect on increasing agricultural
production and reducing ethnic violence in the province. Our findings highlight the
importance of comparing the capacity and welfare implications of distributive politics,
as fiscal subsidies may change the actions of the leader’s local agents more than altering
the behaviors and attitudes of those who may benefit from these transfers.
Keywords: Poverty alleviation; distributive politics; state building; authoritarian regimes;
China
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A key finding in the current literature on distributive politics is that the distributive allo-
cation of government goods and services can contribute to political survival in both demo-
cratic and non-democratic states. In countries with competitive elections, there has been
much discussion on how elected politicians strategically distribute di↵erent varieties of col-
lective and particularistic goods to build their support base (e.g., Stokes and Dunning, 2013;
Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni, 2015). Likewise, recent studies based on authoritarian
regimes have demonstrated that non-democratic leaders allocate di↵erent varieties of public
and private goods to prevent elite defection and popular uprisings while deterring support
for the opposition (e.g., Magaloni, 2006; Blaydes, 2011; Mahdavi, 2015).
We argue that existing studies may have neglected a critical precondition of this widely
accepted conventional wisdom, as suggested by the literature. In many developing coun-
tries and conflict-fraught areas, political leaders often lack adequate institutional means and
apparatus to exercise e↵ective control and detect citizens’ preferences and support (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003; Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar, 2016). Under these constraints,
we argue that distributive allocations can contribute to political survival through a di↵erent
channel – the selective delivery of infrastructure-oriented public projects helps to strengthen
control in areas of contested statehood through increases in the presence of government
agencies and functionaries that can bolster the central state’s administrative and security
surveillance at the grassroots level.
To illustrate our argument, we focus on the Chinese government’s campaign of poverty al-
leviation in Xinjiang, one of the poorest, most unstable, and most ethnically diverse provinces
in the country. In the early 1990s, Beijing announced the campaign of poverty alleviation
and development (fupin kaifa) as a key policy instrument for the Han-dominated Chinese
state to address the issues of economic backwardness and ethnic grievance in Xinjiang (Tong,
2010). Using a unique panel dataset, we analyze the implementation of fiscal assistance and
work-for-relief grants across di↵erent counties, as well as their e↵ects. Both programs were
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key components of China’s national poverty alleviation plan between 1994 and 2000 – namely
the “8-7” Plan. The Plan was introduced to mitigate poverty and increase agricultural pro-
duction in Xinjiang by financing the construction of various production facilities, such as
roads, power grids, and irrigation pumps. We examine how these programs impacted local
public spending and other development outcomes.
We find that poverty-relief transfers in Xinjiang have contributed more to the making
of state capacity than improving rural development and reducing ethnic violence. These
transfers have a statistically significant e↵ect on increasing the local government’s spending
on public security and administrative management. In comparison, the transfers have a
statistically insignificant e↵ect on rural development. In the case of ethnic violence, fiscal
assistance and work-for-relief grants exhibit opposite e↵ects, making anti-poverty payments’
overall impact on conflict reduction ambiguous. Furthermore, we show that the increase
in local state capacity corresponds to the central government’s growing top-down command
over the province. The results suggest that poverty relief in Xinjiang may have largely altered
the local government’s spending priorities toward categories that are crucial not only for the
purpose of project implementation but also for stronger state apparatus.
Our article speaks to the literature on distributive politics and authoritarian governance.
In a broad vein, the findings highlight the need to consider the political implications of
infrastructure-oriented public patronage and individual-oriented particularistic transfers dif-
ferently (e.g., Stokes and Dunning, 2013; Harding and Stasavage, 2014; Diaz-Cayeros, Es-
tevez, and Magaloni, 2015)1 – the former type of allocations may focus more on building
state capacity rather than building political support. The distinction here can be crucial,
1Stokes and Dunning (2013) suggest that politicians tend to o↵er particularistic goods to rural voters
because villages contain densely embedded social networks for political machines to be confident about the
fruit of these payments. In urban areas, political parties can find it harder to identify, mobilize, and coor-
dinate their supporters, and resort to less discriminatory public patronage. Harding and Stasavage (2014)
show that democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa changes a government’s focus of distributive allocations
from public patronage because particularistic benefits are more “attributable,” making it easier for elected
politicians to claim the credit. Finally, Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni (2015) propose that particu-
laristic transfers are su cient to secure the ruling party’s core supporters, while local collective goods are
more useful to attract support from swing voters.
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particularly in the context of authoritarian regimes. Existing studies of distributive allo-
cations in China and non-democratic states have primarily focused on how these strategic
payments contribute to political survival by cultivating and securing support or compliance
among the autocrat’s inner circle or the general public (e.g., Magaloni, 2006; Shih and Qi,
2007; Saich, 2008; Blaydes, 2011; Mahdavi, 2015). We demonstrate that anti-poverty trans-
fers for infrastructure construction can also build the foundation of authoritarian control by
extending the state’s presence in peripheral areas as a means to counter various challenges,
such as lack of information (Lee and Zhang, 2017; Brambor et al., 2020). Our results also
complement Albertus, Fenner, and Slater (2018), who study how autocrats build and main-
tain their power through “coercive distribution” by using redistribution to undermine the
power of rival political forces while extending their authoritarian influence on their citizens.
More research is needed to understand how the strengthening of the administrative state in
authoritarian regimes can lead to better government service delivery or more surveillance.
Our article engages with the literature on Chinese political economy by exploring how
intergovernmental transfers can contribute to the state’s infrastructural presence in periph-
eral ethnic regions. While studies during the past decade have attempted to uncover the
determinants of fiscal subsidies in China (e.g., Su and Yang, 2000; Wang, 2004; Shih, Zhang,
and Liu, 2007), few studies have examined the impact of poverty-alleviation payments on in-
stitutional development.2 Most work aims to understand how the allocated goods encourage
loyalty and compliance among political elites and various groups of citizens in the country
(e.g., Saich, 2008; Solinger, 2015). We use poverty alleviation in Xinjiang to illustrate that
the central government can focus more on “purchasing” capacity when allocating financial
and other resources. Our article also speaks to studies that similarly explore the changing
role of the Chinese state in the Reform Era (Shue, 1988; Hu and Wang, 2001). The results
also suggest that the 8-7 Plan may have paved the way for the targeted poverty alleviation
2Meng (2013) and Lü (2015) serve as exceptions, but they both focus on China as a whole and address
di↵erent research questions. Meng (2013) studies the e↵ect of the status of National Poverty Counties
(NPC) on overall economic development while Lü (2015) focuses on the e↵ect of the NPC status on local
governments’ education spending.
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program introduced by Xi Jinping (see Zeng, 2020).
For causal identification, we employ a newly extended covariate balancing propensity
score (CBPS) to estimate the causal e↵ect of poverty alleviation transfers (Fong, Hazlett,
and Imai, 2018). CBPS combines propensity score estimation with balance covariates to
derive the inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTWs). The method has been general-
ized to allow continuous treatments, as well as introducing a non-parametric balance-based
estimation approach for the weights.3 As alternatives, we employ first-di↵erenced and in-
strumental variable regression analysis, which yields similar results.
We would like to emphasize that poverty alleviation in Xinjiang illuminates the rela-
tionship between distributive politics and state building. Although the poverty alleviation
transfers examined here took place more than two decades ago, it is one of the most well-
documented policy programs through which the central government explicitly declared its
intention to bring order and peace in the province through the construction of large-scale
local public production facilities. Between 1994 and 2000, the Chinese government’s poverty
alleviation campaign allocated nearly five billion RMB to Xinjiang (about 625 million in
USD according to the exchange rates in 2000); in comparison, Yunnan – another ethnically
diverse province – received about one billion RMB. In fact, the size of payments for poverty
alleviation is comparable to other non-poverty-relief fiscal subsidies. In some counties, the
amount of the payments was twice as much as non-relief subsidies. The results of additional
analysis also show that other non-relief intergovernmental transfers do not have the same
capacity-building e↵ects as poverty alleviation payments.
Our article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the existing literature to develop
testable hypotheses. In Section 3, we introduce the campaign of poverty alleviation in China
and its implementation in Xinjiang. In Section 4, we present the data and define the key
3Recent work that includes all counties in China has suggested the application of fuzzy regression dis-
continuity (FRD) design. In the case of Xinjiang, using FRD is nonetheless problematic because it is likely
that Beijing adopted di↵erent criteria to select NPCs in minority areas (Park, Wang, and Wu, 2002). Also,
poverty alleviation transfers covered non-NPC counties, making NPC a less accurate treatment. We will
return to this issue later.
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variables before providing the CBPS and other estimates of the e↵ect of poverty-reduction
transfers in Xinjiang. In Section 5, we examine the implications of local state building
and highlight the central government’s increasing control over the provincial government
throughout the 1990s. We conclude our article by discussing the implications for future
research.
2 Distributive Allocations For State Building
Since Lasswell (1936), who inquires “who gets what, when and how,” many have been
interested in learning why some areas or groups in a country have received more or better
government resources and services (Golden and Min, 2013). Existing studies suggest that
the distributive allocations of public goods and services can contribute to political survival
by shaping the attitudes of those who benefit from these allocations. For instance, elected
politicians, depending on their risk preferences, tend to selectively target their core or swing
voters when rendering distributive decisions (e.g., Stokes and Dunning, 2013; Diaz-Cayeros,
Estevez, and Magaloni, 2015). Also, politicians may have incentives to focus on the poor
because the arranged transfers will create the largest marginal utility to those living in
impoverishment, and, as a result, bring the largest number of votes per dollar spent (Dixit
and Londregan, 1996). Despite the absence of fully competitive elections, recent studies of
authoritarian regimes have shown that the distributive allocations of public goods or private
patronage can help autocrats stay in power (e.g., Magaloni, 2006; Blaydes, 2011; Mahdavi,
2015).
Current research on post-Reform China has similarly explored how fiscal transfers and
social welfare policies have sustained the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy by inducing
loyalty among its members while gaining citizens’ support (Saich, 2008). Shih, Zhang, and
Liu (2007) show that fiscal transfers have been focused on localities with a large number of
Party cadres and associates, in order to retain their political loyalty. In the case of education
reform, Lü (2014) studies how social policy reform can shape Chinese citizens’ perception of
6
government legitimacy. Likewise, Huang (2015) argues that the central government allows
local o cials to undermine the threat of popular grievances by selectively determining the
coverage and generosity of health insurance programs. When constructing the ideal types
of current social assistance programs in China, Solinger (2015) explicitly suggests that the
anti-poverty programs in China aim to address grievances in the general population.
We contend, however, that previous studies may have neglected a crucial precondition.
To ensure these allocations achieve the expected “support-building” scenario, it is crucial
that politicians and government agencies are capable of defining the criteria of payment,
specifying eligible recipients, and ensuring the planned payments will reach designated ben-
eficiaries. Such capacity, as elaborated by Mann (1984), is manifested by the government’s
infrastructural power, undertaken by a set of administrative organizations. The state plays a
crucial role in commanding and coordinating di↵erent government agencies and functionaries
within its territory – their “penetration” into the society builds the foundation for e↵ective
governance, allowing the state to maintain political order while staying informed about citi-
zens’ needs and preferences (e.g., Rotberg, 2004; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Soifer and vom
Hau, 2008).
In many developing countries, state incapacity has hindered e↵ective territorial con-
trol (e.g., Herbst, 2000; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014; Muralidharan, Niehaus, and
Sukhtankar, 2016). Although governments in these countries have been providing various
pro-poor benefits to individuals and households, the implementation of these allocations has
been a daunting task due to low or weak state capacity. For instance, without a functioning
statistical system, the government will not have accurate information to determine or verify
the eligibility of service delivery and locate eligible individuals. Taxation will also be prob-
lematic because government agencies are not fully aware of their tax base. With no e cient
and reliable bureaucracy, there is also no guarantee that the planned payments will take
place. Even in China, where the central state has been considered relatively strong, prior
research has noted similar predicaments, highlighting non-state and familial communities
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as the key forces of local public goods provision (Tsai, 2007; Xu and Yao, 2015). Lee and
Zhang (2017) summarize the importance of information in understanding state capacity, as
the amount and depth of information regarding the citizens and di↵erent locations are crucial
in ensuring e↵ective governance. In their operationalization of state building, Brambor et al.
(2020) adopt a similar position by considering various information collection and processing
activities through government agencies, such as censuses, statistical yearbooks, and civil and
population registers.
These challenges are common in countries fraught with ethnic violence. While previous
studies have explored how fiscal subsidies help to contain regional grievances and prevent
ethnically divided countries from disintegration (e.g., Treisman, 1999), governments in many
of these countries have also had a di cult time imposing reliable administrative and policing
forces to counter rebel and insurgent groups, especially in remote areas (Fearon and Laitin,
2003). Even if fiscal appeasement can be a potential solution to reduce violence and conflicts,
Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) demonstrate that the delivery of government relief can
best reduce conflicts when government administration holds su cient local knowledge.
In a nutshell, the conventional wisdom that the allocations of government goods and ser-
vices will bring loyalty or support can be problematic, as it assumes a certain degree of state
capacity that can be absent in developing or unstable countries. We propose that selective
distributions of anti-poverty goods can contribute to political survival by allowing the state
to build its ruling capacity at the local level. In particular, when poverty alleviation transfers
are allocated to build roads, bridges, power stations, water pumps, and other production fa-
cilities in politically unstable areas, we argue that the government will have the incentive to
build up its administrative and security forces. These forces can play a key role in managing
the allocated resources and supporting the construction of the assigned projects. In the long
run, these agencies and functionaries allow the state to stay informed and to mobilize the
collection of human and financial resources, as suggested by Migdal (2004) – the “routine
performance” of state actors and agencies plays a crucial role in establishing and sustaining
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political control. These infrastructure projects are pivotal for state development, as put by
Van de Walle and Scott (2011) and Joyce and Mukerji (2017), by facilitating the state’s pen-
etration and the standardization of its daily control. In other words, infrastructure-focused
poverty alleviation schemes allow the state to extend its reach to peripheral areas and create
regular forces to exercise its governing authority as the central state establishes mechanisms
to monitor and inspect the progress and outcome of poverty alleviation programs.
In a case study of the Fujian Province in China, Lyons (1998) also hints that poverty
reduction serves to boost the Center’s oversight over the province, as poverty alleviation
entails the creation of new provincial branches of the Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation
and Development in Beijing. In a review of China’s Western Development Program (WDP),
Naughton (2004) also suggests that the infrastructure investment arranged by the central
government may have extended its control in peripheral areas. Outside China, Hechter (1975)
theorizes the concept of “internal colonialism” to elucidate the growth of England’s presence
in the British Isles through administrative expansion and resource extraction. Likewise,
based on the experience of poverty alleviation in Lesotho, Ferguson (1990) finds that road
construction and electrification have facilitated state building in the country. While the
programs initiated by the World Bank may appear to be “apolitical,” these programs have
helped the central state to wield its authority in remote and impoverished areas. Callen
(2016) focuses on how the establishment of the national railway network in the United
States reflected the interactive dynamics between the federal government and individual
states, which in turn shaped the trajectory of state building in the 19th century.
The scenarios we have described above resemble our case of poverty alleviation in Xin-
jiang, as poverty alleviation there explicitly focused on infrastructure construction. In a
conflict-fraught and peripheral province, the central government inevitably needs to tackle
the issue of state incapacity. The corollary of our argument is that poverty alleviation pay-
ments, when focusing on the local public facilities, can trigger the investment in governance
infrastructure that will not only facilitate the construction of these infrastructure projects
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but also strengthen the state’s control in these areas. Our argument thus departs from the
conventional “building support” story, as we focus on how the distributive allocations allow
political elites to increase their control in areas of contested statehood.
Empirically, we focus on the relationship between poverty alleviation transfers and the
local government’s spending priorities. We expect to observe that the transfers allocated for
infrastructure construction lead to increases in public spending in the categories that are vital
for governing capacity. More specifically, following from our argument, the increases in the
capacity-related spending should take place during the construction stage of an infrastructure
project. We expect the e↵ect to be immediate even before the infrastructure is in place.
Existing literature has identified di↵erent dimensions of state capacity (e.g., Hendrix, 2010).
While a comprehensive review is beyond this article’s scope, a capable state will be able
to impose e↵ective control by deploying adequate bureaucratic agencies and security forces
to maintain political and social order to ensure a smooth implementation of its proposed
policies. We therefore expect to see poverty alleviation in Xinjiang associated with increases
in the per capita spending on government administration and public security.
Hypothesis 1. Capacity-building poverty-reduction transfers will increase the local govern-
ment’s per capita spending on public administration.
Hypothesis 2. Capacity-building poverty-reduction transfers will increase the local govern-
ment’s per capita spending on public security.
As government agencies and functionaries are on their way to increasing their security
and administrative capacity, it will take time to build su cient information capacity to
extract taxes and other fiscal revenues – a crucial aspect of state capacity in the literature
(e.g., Levi, 1988). As a result, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 3. Capacity-building poverty-reduction transfers will not immediately increase
the government’s per capita revenue collection.
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When poverty alleviation transfers focus more on the building of administrative and
security capacity, these transfers may not have an immediate e↵ect on development and
conflict reduction since both objectives demand the presence of capable governing forces. In
fact, if the primary objective here is to bolster the government’s administrative and security
capacity, poverty alleviation can even incite more conflicts – “[t]he daily exercise of state
power through public expenditures, security policies, and revenue collection” can end up
reinforcing or exacerbating existing ethnic conflicts (Migdal, 2004, p.29).
Hypothesis 4. Capacity-building poverty-reduction transfers will not immediately improve
rural development.
Hypothesis 5. Capacity-building poverty-reduction transfers will not immediately reduce
ethnic violence.
Our findings on ethnic violence can help to discern the nature of the increases in the
spending on public security. On the one hand, if we observe more security spending along
with an intensification of ethnic violence, then the increases in security spending will serve
as a response to the conflicts rather than boosting the local government’s control in the
province. On the other hand, if the increases in security spending are observed without
seeing more incidents of ethnic violence, security spending in this case perhaps serves as
a preemptive endeavor of the provincial government to facilitate the implementation of as-
signed infrastructure projects, which is consistent with our argument.
The argument we have proposed here does not necessarily suggest that the local govern-
ment has to “divert” the poverty alleviation funds for other purposes. Instead, the argument
suggests that the government will have the incentives to strengthen its governing capacity
to support the execution of the assigned development projects – in the case of Xinjiang, the
poverty alleviation program focused on the construction of production facilities. While it may
be tempting to argue that the Chinese government has used various development programs
to increase repression in the province (see Becquelin, 2000), this scenario is unlikely given
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the data we have or that remains to be verified by future research. In the o cial records,
each poverty alleviation transfer was designated to a specific infrastructure project, and the
data of local finances and the payments for poverty alleviation are separately listed in di↵er-
ent sources (see Section 4.1). As such, the increases in security spending do not necessarily
suggest that the local government was using the poverty alleviation transfers to “pay for
more repression.” Our argument is not that poverty alleviation transfers have “funded” the
spending for public administrative and security; what we attempt to argue is that transfers
for infrastructure construction can encourage more spending on public administrative and
security. Relatedly, poverty relief during the period was not “windfalls” as often depicted
in the literature (e.g., Gervasoni, 2010). The subsidies of interest here were not meant to
release provincial o cials from their existing revenue-collection responsibilities.
Also, we do not argue that the Chinese government has fully resolved the challenges of
weak capacity and political control in Xinjiang through poverty alleviation. The political
and socioeconomic implications of the attempts at state building remain to be studied. Our
theory instead highlights that infrastructure construction can a↵ect public investment in a
way that helps to strengthen the state’s administrative presence and security surveillance in
unstable areas.
3 Poverty Alleviation in Xinjiang
Compared with other provinces, Xinjiang is unique in several ways. For one thing, Xinjiang
is entangled in poverty. Despite four decades of market reform, economic development in
Xinjiang still lags behind wealthy Han coastal provinces. In 2011, Xinjiang had the lowest
disposable income for urban households and ranked among the 9th lowest for disposable
income of rural households (ranked 23rd out of 31 provinces).4 Recent research has also
documented considerable disparity in income and other socioeconomic indicators between
the Han and the Uyghurs, the group that accounts for the majority of the total population
4Source: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2012. Urumqi: The Bureau of Statistics of the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous province, pp. 681-4.
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in Xinjiang (e.g., Bhalla and Luo, 2013; Wu and Song, 2014).
Meanwhile, Xinjiang has been fraught with conflicts between the Han and ethnic minori-
ties (Bovingdon, 2010). The Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim group, constitute the largest ethnic
group in the province.5 Between 1980 and 2000, the provincial government of Xinjiang doc-
umented one large-scale anti-government armed riot, eight inter-group conflicts, 12 incidents
of social disorder, 14 mass protests, and 18 major crimes, including arson, bombings, and the
assassinations of Han and Uyghur government o cials (Provincial Government of Xinjiang,
2004). Such records are exceptional if one considers that other groups have been relatively
compliant and seldom mobilize against Beijing (Dillon, 1999; Kaup, 2000; Han, 2011).
To address this predicament, Beijing introduced a series of poverty alleviation programs,
the earliest of which took place in the 1980s. These programs, covering all poverty-stricken
localities with per capita income below the stipulated income line, were not exclusively
designed for the province.6 However, Xinjiang has constantly been highlighted as a principal
target of the central government’s poverty relief e↵orts. As documented by the o cial
documents (Provincial Government of Xinjiang, 2009), Beijing began providing a variety
of goods and financial support in the mid-1980s. In 1986, the State Council convened the
Leading Group on Economic Development in Impoverished Areas, which Beijing in 1993
turned into the Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development. In the following
year, the Leading Group released “the 8-7 National Plan for Poverty Reduction” (hereafter
“8-7 Plan”), an initiative in which Beijing attempted to relieve the su↵erings of 800 million
(eight yi in Chinese) poor people within seven years.
Under the 8-7 Plan, the central government integrated three programs that had existed
5Between 1994 and 2000, the Uyghurs accounted for about 50% of the total population in Xinjiang. The
Han, the dominant ethnic group in China, accounted for about 30%. In addition to the Uyghurs, Xinjiang is
also home to other non-Han groups, such as the Hui, the Kirghiz people, and the Mongolians. The Uyghurs
accounted for about 80% of the total non-Han population according to the most recent census.
6In 1985, the central government considered a county as “poverty-stricken” if the rural average income
fell below 150 RMB. For counties in old revolutionary base areas and ethnic minority counties, the income
line was 200 or 300 RMB. The latter thresholds were later extended to other counties in China. That said,
as documented by Park, Wang, and Wu (2002), the list of poverty-stricken counties included counties that
were above the originally designated income threshold, thus raising the question of whether the designation
of National Poverty County (NPC) status was indeed solely driven by economic considerations.
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in Xinjiang in the 1980s: Fiscal assistance (caizheng fupin), work-for-relief grants (yigong
daizhen), and special loans (fupin daikuan). The fiscal assistance program was administered
by the provincial government in Urumqi (the capital city of Xinjiang).7 Composed of the
Underdeveloped Areas Funds and the New Grants for Economic Production, fiscal assistance
supplements regular yearly fiscal transfers to provinces. The work-for-relief grant program
was managed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in Beijing,
formerly the State Planning Commission (SPC), providing a consistent regulatory framework
for the allocation and purpose of these grants throughout the country (Zhu, Lai, and Deng,
2001). While the SPC and the subsequent NDRC have their own local branches in Urumqi,
as delineated by (Chow, 2011), these two government bodies are, in fact, centralized so
that their branches are not accountable to the provincial government but to the SPC and
NDRC in Beijing. As a result, the designation of work-for-relief grants is largely under
Beijing’s control. Finally, the special loans were jointly assigned by Urumqi, Beijing, and
the Agricultural Bank of China.
By design, these transfers were delivered to finance the delivery of primary education and
the construction of sanitation, electricity supply, transportation, water pumps, industrial
plants, and other basic infrastructure (Provincial Government of Xinjiang, 2009). In this
article, we focus on the allocation of fiscal assistance and work-for-relief grants because
these two programs were solely under the discretion of provincial and central government.
In contrast, special loans involve the consideration of specific distribution formulas and
stochastic market trends in the financial sector. Also, we will examine the allocation of
poverty-reduction aid between 1994 and 2000 because the data for the 8-7 National Plan
are relatively complete.8 Finally, our analysis excludes all municipalities governed by the
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). XPCC is a unique para-military
7The Ministry of Finance and the Working Group on Poverty Alleviation and Development in the provin-
cial government were responsible for allocating the grants from the fiscal assistance program.
8The provincial government of Xinjiang stopped reporting the distribution of work-for-relief grants at
county level after 2004. It also did not provide additional information about riots and protests during the
2000s.
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economic organization that can be traced back to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
troops that Beijing dispatched to take over the province after the Civil War (Wei, 2011).
The campaign of poverty alleviation and development has by no means treated all coun-
ties in the province equally. As shown in Figure 1, the average amount of transfers varies
sharply across Xinjiang, which thus warrants additional explanation and analysis in the fol-
lowing sections. Moreover, notice that these two programs, which were managed by di↵erent
government agents, more or less concentrated on a similar group of counties. At glance,












Figure 1: Per capita fiscal assistance and work-for-relief grants across all counties in Xinjiang
during the 8-7 National Plan.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data and Variables
We analyze a unique dataset that includes various fiscal, political, demographic, and eco-
nomic variables for all counties in Xinjiang between 1994 and 2000. The data are col-
lected from various sources, such as the Xinjiang Yearbook, the Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook,
and the Xinjiang Gazetteers. Additional fiscal data are taken from the Fiscal Statistics of
Provinces, Municipalities, and Counties in China. The unit of analysis is county-year. As
9See Section 5 for more discussion on the relationship between central and local payments.
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Figure 2: Fiscal assistance and work-for-relief grants during the 8-7 National Plan.
the lowest level of government administration in China, the county is the level of government
administration where the Chinese government implemented the 8-7 Plan. Table A1 in the
appendix provides the summary statistics of our variables.
4.1.1 Poverty-Alleviation Transfers
The main explanatory variables are the per capita payments of two types of relief transfers
(yuan/person): Fiscal assistance and work-for-relief grants. Both variables are logged given
their skewed distributions.10 As mentioned above, under the 8-7 Program, fiscal assistance
was largely at the discretion of the provincial government in Urumqi while the central gov-
ernment in Beijing mainly managed the work-for-relief grants. Studying these two programs
separately will allow us to examine whether these two levels of government jurisdictions had
similar or di↵erent distributive imperatives when they allocated poverty-relief transfers in
Xinjiang.
Figure 2 shows the relative size of these two programs during the 8-7 Plan. While the
total amount of poverty alleviation transfers grew significantly over time, work-for-relief
grants accounted for a larger share of these transfers. However, per capita fiscal assistance
grew dramatically between 1994 and 2001.
10For each variable, we add .001 before carrying out log transformation to avoid unnecessary missing
values.
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4.1.2 Capacity-related Government Spending
The primary outcomes of interest are three measures that can capture the government’s
e↵orts at state building from local government’s spending data. First, we use the rate of
change in per capita local fiscal revenues to indicate local government’s capacity to collect
resources.11 Next, we use the rates of change in per capita government spending on public
security and administrative management respectively to measure the attempt to increase the
security and administrative capacity of local government.12
4.1.3 Rural Development
In line with existing studies that investigate the e↵ectiveness of Chinese poverty alleviation
campaigns (e.g., Park, Wang, and Wu, 2002; Meng, 2013), we use the change in per capita
agricultural production as the outcome variable in order to estimate the welfare e↵ect of
poverty-alleviation transfers. Including the change in per capita agricultural production
as one of the outcome variables allows us to compare the impact of the 8-7 Program over
di↵erent capacity- and welfare-related outcomes. If the 8-7 Plan focused more on capacity
building as hypothesized, the allocated transfers should have a smaller or even insignificant
e↵ect on the growth of the rural economy.
4.1.4 Ethnic Violence
We include a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if a county had at least one incident of
ethnic violence in the previous year. The violence data are provided by Bovingdon (2010) and
Cao et al. (2018). In line with Cao et al. (2018), we use this variable to indicate the presence
of any ethnically related political instability in a county, such as terrorism, insurgency, riots,
11It is calculated by dividing all non-subsidy local revenues by total population.
12Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015), in their study on state capacity in Colombia, adopt
the size of national and local government agencies and employees to measure governments’ administrative
capacity. In China, such data are scant and often incomplete due to the unclear definition of public employees.
Prior studies of Chinese intergovernmental transfers (e.g., Shih, Zhang, and Liu, 2007) used the size of fiscal
dependents, which refers to the citizens who are placed on public payrolls, to measure a similar concept. We
prefer per capita administrative spending (e.g., Dincecco and Katz, 2016) instead because fiscal dependents,
which might be defined di↵erently across di↵erent years and localities, often include former cadres, retired
military o cers, and employees of other social organizations.
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assassinations, and violent street protests.
As suggested by Han and Paik (2014), using an indicator is more appropriate than using
the frequencies because counting the actual number of incidents is often di cult or impossi-
ble. Figure 3 shows the number of counties that witnessed the occurrence of ethnic violence
between 1994 and 2000. Noticeably, nearly a third of counties in Xinjiang were a✏icted by
ethnic violence.
























Figure 3: Number of counties with ethnic violence between 1994 and 2000.
4.1.5 Other Variables
We include the following economic and demographic confounders. First, we control for the
log of each county’s lagged GDP per capita (yuan/person). If poverty alleviation aims at eco-
nomic equalization, the Center and the provincial government should concentrate transfers
on areas with relatively low average income.
Beijing and Urumqi can focus on counties where county governments are incapable of
collecting adequate revenues in their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, we include fiscal
dependence, defined as the share of fiscal subsidies allocated through other channels in each
county’s total revenues. If poverty alleviation focuses on supporting fiscally weak local
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governments, the degree of fiscal dependence will be positively correlated with observed
transfers. Finally, we include each county’s economic growth rate because the allocation
of the relief payments can be based on the principle of economic productivity and thus
continuously focus on growing counties. In our analysis, all economic variables are lagged
by one year.
We also control for the proportion of Uyghur population in each county. Since the 1980s,
the Uyghurs have been involved in many incidents of ethnic violence in the province. As the
government highlighted “ethnic minority areas” as a key target for poverty alleviation (Park,
Wang, and Wu, 2002), poverty-relief transfers may be positively correlated with the relative
size of the Uyghur population in each county.13 In addition, we include population density
in each county. Considering the prevalence of “urban bias” in China and other developing
countries (e.g., Wallace, 2013), densely populated localities may receive more transfers when
other things are held constant.14
4.2 Identification Strategy
Given the concerns of reverse causality and selection bias, the conventional approach to
regress the outcome variables on transfers and other variables may yield estimates that say
little about the causal e↵ect of poverty alleviation. Recent work has adopted rigorous causal
identification strategies to estimate the e↵ect of poverty alleviation programs. Meng (2013)
and Lü (2015) both employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design. Treating the
1992 average rural income as the forcing variable, both studies claim that the FRD design
provides a quasi-experiment setting since the assignment of treatment status on either side of
the cuto↵ along the forcing variable can be treated as if random. The FRD design relies on the
13As shown in Table A1, the proportion of Uyghur population varies dramatically across all counties, from
2% to 99.5%. We carry out an analysis to examine whether there is a quadratic relationship between the
proportion of Uyghur population and the per capita amount of poverty alleviation transfers. The results are
statistically insignificant.
14The demographic variables are not lagged by one-year because their values remained quite stable between
1994 and 2001. Also, for population statistics, we use the most recent version published by the provincial
government of Xinjiang after 2000 given that some data published in the 1990s show irregularities (e.g., the
sum of each group’s population size is not consistent with the published size of the total population).
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assumption that the poverty line (RMB 400) specified by the central government will increase
the probability that a county would be designated as a National Poverty County (NPC) under
the 8-7 Plan, the treatment status of interest.15 With the FRD design, the poverty line based
on the 1992 rural average income can be used as the instrumental variable for NPC status
to estimate the e↵ect of poverty alleviation in the full sample or in a subsample that only
includes observations within a given bandwidth around the income cut-o↵ point.
While the FRD design is compelling, we argue that it is not a useful identification strategy
in the context of Xinjiang for several reasons. First, both studies use the 1992 rural per
capita income with RMB 400, the nationwide poverty line defined by Beijing, to create
the discontinuity design such that being under RMB 400 increases a county’s probability of
being selected as a National Poverty County (NPC).16 However, in Xinjiang, where Beijing
named 25 NPCs in 1994, only two counties had rural average income below RMB 400.17
Given the unique political situation in Xinjiang, it is very likely that Beijing used di↵erent
and additional economic and political criteria to determine the NPC status in the province
(Park, Wang, and Wu, 2002). Second, both studies create a binary indicator of NPC as
the treatment when estimating the e↵ect of the 8-7 Plan. Doing so can conceal important
information as there remains considerable variation regarding the actual amount of payments
across designated NPCs. In fact, as explained by the Provincial Government of Xinjiang
(2009), the 8-7 Plan also intentionally included non-NPC counties, making NPC status a
less accurate treatment status for the province.
We employ the recently developed covariate balance propensity score (CBPS) to estimate
the causal e↵ects of poverty alleviation on state capacity, rural development, and ethnic vio-
lence in Xinjiang. The CBPS, like other propensity score estimation techniques, follows the
strategy of “selection on the observables” (SOO) to identify causal e↵ect from observational
15In other words, contrary to the sharp regression discontinuity design, the poverty line does not perfectly
determine the treatment status.
16It should be noted that other scholars have expressed concern about using income data as the forcing
variable because income statistics might be subject to the government’s manipulation.
17Among these 25 NPCs in Xinjiang, 11 of them had been designated as NPCs in 1986 (Provincial Gov-
ernment of Xinjiang, 2009).
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data. SOO posits that one can identify, at least partially, the e↵ect if observations in the
sample are nearly identical based on observed pre-treatment covariates. The observations
only di↵er regarding the status of treatment assignment. With the assumption that no addi-
tional unobserved confounders exist, whether a unit receives the treatment or not can then
be presumed to be “as if random” within a stratum of observed pre-treatment covariates. In
practice, the SOO strategy uses observed covariates to construct counterfactuals against the
treated units to identify the e↵ect (Sekhon, 2009). A common estimation technique based on
the SOO strategy is matching, through which researchers use observable variables to “pair”
most similar observations, between which the assignment of treatment can be reasonably
assumed “as if” random. One can also carry out matching or weighting by using observed
covariates to estimate treatment assignment, namely the “propensity score,” for each unit
and apply the derived scores or weights to adjust observed confounded imbalances between
the treated and control units. In addition to propensity score, the SOO assumption also
leads to the adoption of inverse probability treatment weight (IPTW) to reconstruct the
condition under which the treatment is independent of pre-treatment covariates (Robins,
Hernan, and Brumback, 2000).
However, the standard matching and propensity score approaches only allow binary treat-
ment status. The parametric estimation of propensity score can also be biased if the model
is not correctly specified. The CBPS explicitly addresses these two challenges. While the
CBPS achieves covariate balance and treatment prediction at the same time (Imai and
Ratkovic, 2014), recent progress on CBPS provides a non-parametric estimation of IPTW
weights, making model misspecification a less severe concern. More crucially, the extended
CBPS generalizes the treatment regime to accommodate non-binary and continuous treat-
ments (Fong, Hazlett, and Imai, 2018). The new CBPS is thus more appropriate for current
purposes, given that poverty-reduction transfers, the primary treatment of interest, are con-
tinuous variables. The conventional FRDD estimation is problematic in this case as it cre-
ates extremely few cases under the discontinuity of the forcing variable under the stipulated
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threshold for e↵ect identification.
In sum, we prefer CBPS over FRD design. The implementation of CBPS analysis begins
with the estimation of CBPS weights. The estimation is carried out by regressing the treat-
ment variables, namely the per capita amount of fiscal assistance or work-for-relief grants,
on observed pre-treatment covariates, including the log of lagged GDP per capita, lagged
fiscal dependence, lagged economic growth rate, the proportion of Uyghur population, and
population density (log) in county i and year t 1.18 The derived CBPS weights will then be
applied in the conventional OLS analysis to estimate the e↵ects of poverty-alleviation trans-
fers. We regress the outcome variables on both treatments (i.e., per capita fiscal assistance
and work-for-relief grants), controlling for all observed covariates X.
yi,t = ↵ +  (Treatment)i,t 1 +Xi,t 1  + ✏i,t, (1)
where y refers to the outcome variable at county i in year t. The coe cient   indicates
the estimated treatment e↵ects of poverty alleviation transfers. X represents the matrix of
pre-treatment covariates while   is the vector of their corresponding coe cients. We cluster
the standard errors by county to account for within-county correlation of errors over time.19
4.3 Main Results
Figure 4 presents the estimated treatment e↵ects of fiscal assistance and work-for-relief grants
with 95% confidence intervals.20 We carry out the analysis with and without one-year lagged
18In our matching estimations, we first partial out the county and year fixed e↵ects of outcome, treatment,
and observed covariates. The fixed e↵ects, first, will help to address the e↵ects of border counties as Beijing
has been highlighting border localities as the potential source of ethnic separatism in Xinjiang. They are
also useful in taking into account the fact that the Chinese government has highlighted three Southern
prefectures in Xinjiang as the main destinations for the campaign of poverty alleviation and development
since the 1990s. The fixed e↵ects can account for the bargaining power of county o cials in demanding
poverty alleviation transfers. As suggested by previous studies (Su and Yang, 2000), provincial o cials with
political connections with the central government may receive more subsidies than their unconnected peers.
Finally, the fixed e↵ects will also be useful to capture any unobserved migration trend that was not fully
recorded by the available data.
19The estimation of CBPS weights should render the treatment marginally correlated with all observed
confounding covariates after weighting. We present the diagnostics in the appendix.
20The complete regression tables are available in the appendix.
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dependent variables to capture the unobserved trend in the dependent variables over time.
As shown in Figure 4, the results are similar, although including lagged dependent variables




















(b) Include Lagged DV
Figure 4: Estimated e↵ects of poverty-alleviation transfers (CBPS estimations). The error
bars show 95% confidence intervals.
The first two outcomes concern the e↵ect of poverty alleviation transfers on the govern-
ment’s security and administrative capacity. To begin, both poverty alleviation payments
have a positive e↵ect on the rate of change in per capita spending on public security. The
point estimates are consistently statistically significant with and without the lagged depen-
dent variable. In contrast, with 95% confidence intervals, the e↵ects of poverty alleviation
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on per capita spending on administrative management are only statistically significant when
the treatment is per capita fiscal assistance. Altogether, the transfers under the 8-7 Plan
appear to boost local government’s capacity on public security and, to a lesser degree, ad-
ministrative management. Given that per capita fiscal assistance and work-for-relief grants
grew by seven times and by 50% respectively before and after the 8-7 Plan, the estimated
coe cients suggest that fiscal assistance and work-for-relief transfers, respectively, accounted
for about 10% and 15% of the increases in per capita security and administrative spendings.
Next, neither poverty-alleviation program has a conclusive e↵ect on the rate of change in
per capita local fiscal revenue. For both treatments, the estimated e↵ects are not statistically
di↵erent from zero. This result is consistent with the “building capacity” hypothesis – as
government agencies and functionaries build up their ruling capacity at the grassroots level,
there can be a time lapse before they can fully take control of the local tax base for resource
extraction.
Finally, while poverty alleviation appears to have positive e↵ects on building the govern-
ment’s security and administrative capacity, its impact on rural development and conflict
reduction is mixed or even negative. First, while the estimated e↵ect on the rate of change
in per capita agricultural production is always positive, the estimated e↵ect becomes sta-
tistically di↵erent from zero only in the case of work-for-relief grants. The two programs
demonstrate opposite e↵ects on the prevention of ethnic conflicts. On the one hand, the
work-for-relief grants seem to undermine it (although the e↵ect is not statistically signifi-
cant); on the other hand, fiscal assistance appears to intensify ethnic violence.21
To illustrate, several policy campaigns that took place at the same time as the 8-7 Plan in-
deed align with our quantitative findings. As documented by the yearbooks of Xinjiang, first,
we found that the provincial government was involved in a series of campaigns to increase its
presence at the grassroots level, particularly by establishing a large number of service points
of civil a↵airs across the province. The o cial attempts of community building started with
21In the appendix, we use the frequencies of ethnic violence for robustness check; the results are similar
to those based on the dummy variable.
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Urumqi and were later expanded to other prefectures such as Aksu, Bortala, Ili, and Kash-
gar toward the end of the 8-7 Plan. During the same period, the public security bureau of
Xinjiang also carried out various endeavors to strengthen the government’s control of the
population in the province. More specifically, these endeavors aimed to boost the provincial
government’s surveillance over household registration (especially in the countryside), as well
as the issuing of identity documents.
4.4 Counterarguments and Robustness Checks
We carry out several additional tests to evaluate the robustness of the main findings and
address rival arguments. All results are available in the appendix.
One may contend that poverty alleviation transfers may merely increase the government’s
overall spending instead of boosting security and administrative capacity. We have conducted
another analysis with non-capacity government spending as the outcome variable and find
that neither relief payment has a statistically significant e↵ect on government spending on
categories unrelated to administrative management and public security (Table A9). The
results also suggest, while one may contend that our outcome variables represent patronage
(Ang, 2016), the spending for other categories that might be used for patronage (e.g., fixed
asset construction) seems una↵ected. Likewise, one may argue that poverty alleviation is
only a part of Beijing’s financial support in Xinjiang. As a result, the e↵ects of relief
transfers are trivial. We conduct another test to estimate the e↵ects of per capita non-
relief intergovernmental transfers and find that they do not have any noticeable impact on
the main outcome variables (Table A10). We have also conducted a separate analysis to
see whether poverty alleviation transfers, to facilitate local state-building, have impacted
telecommunication within Xinjiang. As shown in Table A11, we do not find any statistically
significant results. The results, however, are not surprising given that, during the 8-7 Plan,
poverty alleviation in the province primarily focused on the construction of agricultural
production facilities. We have also estimated whether the 8-7 Plan had any impact on
the growth of GDP per capita, which does not yield consistently significant results (Table
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A12) – that said, in the case of work-for-relief transfers, poverty alleviation appears to
have a negative impact. One may argue that poverty alleviation in Xinjiang meant to
create government jobs for the Han Chinese even though these transfers were for designated
infrastructure projects. We have carried out two tests to examine whether the 8-7 Program
had any impact on the size of the Han population, as well as the size of the fiscally dependent
population, which includes local o cials. We do not find any statistically significant results
(see Tables A13 and A14). While these two dependent variables may not rule out the
possible changes in the presence of Han o cials in Xinjiang brought by poverty alleviation
transfers, we believe that increasing the presence of the Chinese Han in the government
is still consistent with our argument. That is, poverty alleviation in Xinjiang has largely
strengthened the control of the Han-dominated Chinese state.
Finally, we have also conducted an additional test based on a longer panel dataset that
includes all variables until 2004. The findings shown in Figure 5 are mostly similar to
the main findings – the only notable exception is that the estimated e↵ects on the growth
of per capita security spending are no longer significant, although they remain positive as
hypothesized. The exception here, however, should be received with caution as it is important
to point out that the Chinese government changed the way spending on public security was
recorded during the 2000-2001 fiscal year.
4.5 Alternative Identification
We conduct an alternative analysis with all variables being first-di↵erenced to address model
endogeneity, as suggested by Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) (Section A3). Meanwhile,
we aggregate our observations by county and instrument the treatment with per capita relief
between 1990 and 1993. Here we assume that the 8-7 Plan mostly reorganized and continued
the previous campaign of poverty alleviation in the late 1980s and early 1990s rather than
targeting a di↵erent set of localities, an assumption that is plausible based on our review
above. The results still support our main hypotheses. We find that changes in poverty
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Figure 5: Estimated e↵ects of poverty-alleviation transfers (CBPS estimations), 1994-2004.
The error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
in per capita security spending. The instrumental variable (IV) estimations suggest that
poverty relief under 8-7 only had a significantly positive e↵ect on per capita spending on
public security and government administration (Section A4 in the appendix).
In sum, the empirical results align more closely with the proposed “building capacity”
hypothesis of poverty reduction. We find that poverty alleviation under the 8-7 Plan in Xin-
jiang appears to focus more on strengthening the government’s ruling capacity to maintain
security and order with the presence of public administration.
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5 Increases in Central Command Over Provincial Transfers
The results above suggest that poverty alleviation under the 8-7 Plan mainly focused on
strengthening the security and administrative capacity of local governments in Xinjiang.
One may still wonder how the presence of more capable local governments contributes to
the central government’s control.
We conduct an ordinary least square (OLS) test to study the relationship between fiscal
assistance and work-for-relief grants. In the following analysis, Concurrent aid is the key
explanatory variable.22 The estimated coe cients, if positive, will imply that these two
programs “reinforce” each other. In contrast, a negative coe cient will indicate these two
programs “substitute” for each other, as a locality will receive less support from one program
if it receives more from the other program. In addition to Concurrent aid, we control for
lagged GDP per capita (log), lagged fiscal dependence, lagged economic growth rate, a binary
indicator of previous ethnic violence, the proportion of Uyghur population, and population
density:
Per capita tranferi,t,p = ↵ +  (Concurrent aid)i,t 1 +X  + i + ⌧t + ✏i,t, (2)
where i and t refer to individual county and year respectively. The matrix X denotes the
control variables;   is the vector of their corresponding coe cients. The model also includes
county- () and year-fixed e↵ects (⌧) to account for additional unobserved location-specific
and time-invariant factors. We cluster the standard errors by county to account for within-
county correlation of errors over time. The main coe cient of interest is  .
Table 1 presents the results. The Concurrent aid coe cients for fiscal assistance and
work-for-relief grants are all statistically significant and positive. However, while the positive
correlation between the two programs suggests some degree of mutual reinforcement between
22To illustrate, when the dependent variable is per capita fiscal assistance, the model will control for per
capita work-for-relief grants.
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the central and provincial governments, the size of coe cients is smaller in the case of work-
for-relief grants. Using the coe cients from the full model (Models 4 and 8), a 1% increase in
work-for-relief grants on average corresponds to a 0.4% increase in fiscal assistance, while a
1% increase in fiscal assistance only corresponds to a 0.2% increase in work-for-relief grants.
Therefore, work-for-relief grants, compared with fiscal assistance, seem less complementary.
Moreover, the estimated coe cients from Models (1) to (4) reveal that fiscal assistance, after
taking into account possible explanatory factors, is only correlated with the work-for-relief
grants allocated by the central government in Beijing.
Fiscal assistance Work-for-relief

















(0.094) (0.098) (0.098) (0.094) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.037)
Lagged GDP per capita (log)  0.892  0.822  1.848⇤⇤  1.862⇤⇤
(1.592) (1.568) (0.804) (0.813)




(3.997) (3.947) (2.318) (2.333)
Economic growth (percent)  0.226  0.228 0.228⇤ 0.246⇤
(0.239) (0.235) (0.129) (0.127)
Riot (=1) 0.405 0.308 0.341 0.456
(0.480) (0.447) (0.390) (0.377)
Share of Uyghur (percent) 15.962 21.495 14.628  6.990
(29.431) (31.794) (15.584) (15.095)
Population density (log)  0.423  0.212  0.176  0.430  0.732  1.287  1.257  0.827
(3.939) (3.248) (3.221) (3.838) (1.972) (2.189) (2.202) (1.938)
Constant 1.069  5.301  6.514  0.916 9.859 0.357  0.746 10.623
(21.552) (8.731) (8.029) (21.040) (7.324) (5.802) (5.861) (7.256)
Observations 570 587 587 570 570 587 587 570
Adjusted R
2
0.566 0.560 0.560 0.566 0.812 0.784 0.785 0.812
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 1: Correlation between the two poverty alleviation programs. All models include
county and year fixed e↵ects with robust-cluster standard errors by county.
We then study how the correlation between the two programs evolved over time. We run
the tests that let the Concurrent aid coe cients vary by year. As shown in Figure 6, at the
beginning the estimate is negative for fiscal assistance, which suggests that Urumqi mostly
allocated fiscal assistance to localities that were not covered by work-for-relief grants. Put
di↵erently, fiscal assistance started as a substitute for work-for-relief grants, although it ap-
pears that work-for-relief grants also attempted to complement fiscal assistance. After 1997,
however, the two programs became clearly positively correlated, suggesting that they began
to complement each other. Interestingly, this change is consistent with the observation that
poverty alleviation in Xinjiang during the 8-7 Plan grew primarily under Beijing’s command.
In 1997, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in Beijing began to
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participate in the management of fiscal assistance (Meng, 2000). This change coincided with
the year in which the central government convened a Politburo Standing Committee meeting,
which demanded the central government’s more active command over poverty alleviation in
Xinjiang (Tong, 2010). As the central government commanded the distributive allocations
of poverty relief transfers, empowering the local state seems to, accordingly, have increased



















Figure 6: Correlation between the two poverty alleviation programs by year. The error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
6 Conclusion
This article presents a systematic analysis of poverty alleviation transfers in Xinjiang during
the 8-7 National Plan. Consistent with the hypotheses, we find that the relief payments have
encouraged the local government to increase its spending, which facilitated the implementa-
tion of the assigned projects and increased political control in the long run. More specifically,
the 8-7 National Plan appears to have the most salient impact on boosting the government’s
security and administrative capacity through the construction of public infrastructure. As
we examine how poverty alleviation leads to the enlargement of local state apparatus as part
of broad state-building endeavors, our results align with recent reflections on the “hearts
and minds” strategy as a means of conflict reduction (e.g., Hazelton, 2017).
In a broad vein, our findings reinforce the importance of the distinction between di↵erent
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types of government goods and services. While much of the literature has focused on how
particularistic anti-poverty payments can increase political elites’ chance of political survival
by improving beneficiaries’ material well-being, we show that intergovernmental transfers
that the government allocates to mitigate poverty through infrastructure construction can
focus more on building the government’s ruling capacity at the grassroots level. Recent stud-
ies on both democratic and non-democratic countries have discussed the di↵erence between
public patronage and more individual-oriented transfers, which can be present in specific
contexts and yield di↵erent implications for political survival. These distinctions are crucial
for those interested in authoritarian governance – more research is needed to understand the
political and socioeconomic implications of an increasingly stronger administrative and secu-
rity state. Will greater state capacity necessarily lead to better government service delivery
and revenue collection, which can contribute to authoritarian durability without much use
of repression? If yes, how long will it take?
Furthermore, our findings suggest the need to distinguish di↵erent types of outcomes.
While the literature highlights that selective delivery of government goods and services con-
tributes to political survival by improving recipients’ well-being, we argue and demonstrate
that these distributive allocations may also help to sustain political power by inducing the
building of state capacity. To fully evaluate the e↵ect of public goods and service provision,
it is crucial to separate and take account of capacity- and welfare-related outcomes. In the
case of Xinjiang, to construct the assigned production facilities, the county governments
allocated additional funds to strengthen their administrative and security capacity, which in
turn strengthened political control in the long run.
One can extend the current project to other ethnic autonomous regions, as well as other
provinces, to see whether the same pattern seen in Xinjiang travels or not. The Chinese
government may be preoccupied with redistribution between rich and poor areas in more
stable but similarly poverty-stricken provinces. Local o cials who seek to maximize their
career prospects by achieving economic prosperity may also highlight economic e ciency by
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focusing on fast growing localities governed by their upper-level allies when allocating fiscal
transfers (e.g., Jiang, 2018). The statistical results in this article can be complemented by
qualitative evidence to capture additional insights. For instance, if the objectives of resource
allocation indeed vary between di↵erent levels of local jurisdictions, it will be enlightening
to interview any government o cial who has personally experienced alternative distributive
imperatives when serving in other provinces.
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